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RECENT DECISIONS

ABSTRACTS

Kathmne Kempfer*
ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL - SURVIVAL OF Wmow's CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR ALLOWANCE - A widow brought claim for an allowance for support
and maintenance pending administration of her husband's estate. The claim
was denied by the probate court and while appeal was pending in the district
court the widow died. Her executor had the district court enter a conditional
order of •revival to which a plea in abatement was filed. The district court
overruled the plea in abatement and the executors and heirs of the husband's
estate appealed. Held, order of revival reversed and action for allowance
dismissed. While a Nebraska statute 1 provides that no action pending in any
court shall abate by the death of either or both parties ( with certain named
exceptions), this section must be construed with another section of the statutes 2
which provides that an action does not abate by the death of a party "if the
cause of action survive or continue." The widow's action for allowance did
not survive at common law and there is no statute providing for her heirs or
executors upon her death. Therefore the cause of action did not survive and
there is nothing to revive. 8 In re Samson's Estate, (Neb. 1942) 7 N. W.

(2d) 60.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION GROUNDS FOR DECISION - PURCHASE OF STOCK BY OFFICERS PENDING
REORGANIZATION - Respondents were officers, directors, and controlling
stockholders of the Federal Water Service Corporation, a holding company
registered under the Public Utility Holding Company Act. The stock of the
corporation consisted of preferred, and two classes of common. Respondents
controlled Federal through their control of its parent, Utility Operators Com-

* Managing Editor,

Michigan Law Review.
Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929), § 20-1402.
2 Id., § 20-322.
8 The only cases exactly in point cited by the court in accord with its view were
Cox v. Brown, 27 N. C. 194 (1844) and Ex parte Dunn, 63 N: C. 137 (1869).
Missouri takes the opposite view. Williams v. Schneider, (Mo. App. 1928) I S. W.
(2d) 230.
1
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pany, which owned all the outstanding shares of Federal's Class B common
stock, representing the controlling voting power in the company. At the time
of registering in 1937 the management filed a plan for reorganization which
was rejected by the Securities and Exchange Commission because it provided
for participation by the Class B stockholders. Two subsequent plans were proposed and rejected for the same reason. Finally in March 1940 the company
submitted a plan which did not provide for participation by the Class B stockholders. However, in the meantime the respondents had purchased on the
open market sufficient preferred stock to give them more than ten per cent of
the common stock of the new corporation. These purchases were made overthe-counter at market price-a price only one-fourth the book value of the
new stock. The SEC admitted that "honesty, full disclosure, and purchase at
a fair price" characterized the transactions, but held nevertheless that their
fiduciary duty to other stockholders forbad respondents from dealing in stock
of the corporation pending reorganization. It approved the plan for reorganization on condition that no common stock be isued to respondents but that they be
paid the purchase price of the preferred stock plus four per cent interest. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 1 set aside the commission's order
and the latter brought certiorari. Held, decision remanded for further proceedings. An administrative decision, like a lower court decision dependent upon
a particular finding of fact by a jury, cannot be sustained when the necessary
fact determination is absent. The ruling of the SEC is apparently based on
the common law as to standards imposed on corporate officers and directors, but
the cases 2 cited do not go so far. Under sections I 7 (a) and (b) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act 3 the SEC has power to correct abuses found
"detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers."
But it does not base the present decision on that power. Justices Black, Reed
and Murphy dissented on the ground that the decision of the commission should
be considered as the setting of a new standard under its broad powers. Justice
Douglas did not participate. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery
Corp., (U. S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 454.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW- SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION POWER TO ENJOIN SHAREHOLDER FROM CIRCULATING FALSE STATEMENTS
REGARDING THE COMPANY- On September 16, 1924, the Electric Bond &
Share Company filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission "a notice,
proxy statement and form of proxy" in connection with an annual stockholders
meeting to be held October 14, 1942. A few days later defendant filed copies
of a letter to stockholders asking them not to sign any proxies for the company
and to revoke any which they might have already signed. In this letter he
made "false and misleading" statements as to the financial position of the com1 Chenery Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Comm., (App. D. C. 1942) 128 F.
(2d) 303, noted IO UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 70 (1942), 56 HARV. L. REv. 126 (1942).
2
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 60 S. Ct. 238 (194<;>); Michoud v. Girod,
4_How. (45 U. S.) 503 at 557 (1846); Magruder v. Drury, 235 U. S. 106, 35 S.
Ct. 77 (1915).
3
49 Stat. L. 830, § 17 (1935), 15 U.S. C. (1940), § 79 q.
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pany. The SEC brought complaint before a district court aski.l}g for an injunction, alleging that defendant intended to prevent a quorum and cause a
postponement of the meeting and thereafter himself solicit proxies as a means
of having himself elected an officer. The district court dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, held, the power of the commission to regulate the solicitation of a
"proxy, power of attorney, consent or authorization" 1 is broad enough to include a letter, such as that here concerned, which is a step in the process of
solicitation. While the date of the meeting is now past and it is not shown
whether or not there was an adjournment, nevertheless the controversy has
not become moot since defendant may still profit from the misinformation he
has spread among the stockholders and the commission may now wish to secure
an affirmative order from the district court that defendant correct that misinformation before soliciting any proxies. Judgment reversed. Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Okin, (C. C. A. 2d, 1943) 132 F. (2d) 784, cert.
den. (U. S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 525.2
APPEAL AND ERROR - DIRECTION OF VERDICT ON APPEAL FROM
DENIAL OF MOTION FOR NEW TR:rAL.-In an action for wrongful death in an
automobile accident, verdict ·was for defendant and plaintiff appealed after
denial of motion for new trial. The errors charged were an improper instruction to the jury on the question of emergency and the submission ·to the jury
of the questions of decedent's contributory negligence and defendant's negligence where the evidence was clear. Held, the evidence made a clear case for
the plaintiff as a matter of law and verdict will be directed for plaintiff, the
case being remanded for trial of the amount of damages only. One justice
dissented on the ground that neither statute nor precedent gave the appellate
court power to direct a verdict in favor of a party who had neither moved for
a directed verdict during the trial nor for judgment after its conclusion. Lee v.
Zaske, (Minn. 1942) 6 N. W. (2d) 793. 1
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT - INTEGRATED BAR AcT As VIOLATING DuE
PROCESS - During the trial of a case, defendants objected to the appearance as
one of the counsel for plaintiffs of a lawyer who was not on the "active" list
of attorneys of the State Bar of Michigan, but was on the "inactive" list. The
rules adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court under the Integrated Bar Act 1
provide for two classes of members of the State Bar. Active members are re1 Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. L. 823, § xz (e), 15
U. S. C. (1940), § 79 1 (e).
2
Noted 56 HARV. L. REv. 829 (1943).
1
In a converse situation, where the appellant had moved for judgment notwithstanding verdict or new trial in the alternative and the trial court had ruled on the
first motion only, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to consider the second motion.
Goodrich v. Sprague, 376 Ill. 80, 32 N. E. (2d) 897 (1941); Walaite v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry., 376 Ill. 59, 33 N. E. (2d) II9 (1941); 19 Cm-KENT L. REv. 275
(1941); 29 ILL. B. J. 477 (1941).
1

Mich. Pub. Acts (1935), No. 58, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938), §§ 27.101, 27.102.
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quired to pay annual dues-of $5 each. Inactive members are relieved from the
payment of dues, but are prohibited from practicing law and from voting or
holding office in the State Bar. Plaintiffs claimed that the -practice of law is a
property right and that the Integrated Bar Act in giving the. court power to
regulate that right took1away property without due process. Held, the practice
of law is not a property right, the supreme .court has inherent power to regulate
the qualifications of persons permitted to practice law in 1the state, and that the
legislature has adopted a statute to that effect does not make the act invalid.
Therefore a lawyer on the inactive list of the State Bar has no right to engage
in the practice of law. Ayres v. Hadaway, 303 Mich. 589, 6 N. W. (2d) 905
(1942).2
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT- LIEN FOR FEE WHERE CLIENT AGREES To
SETTLEMENT AFTER JuoGMENT WITHOUT ATTORNE¥'s KNOWLEDGEPope, an attorney, entered into a contract with Robinson to represent him in
~ personal injury action against·the Jellico Coal Mining Company. Pope was
to receive fifty per cent of whatever sum was realized on the claim and no
settlement was to be made without the consent of all parties. In a suit on the
claim, judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $ I 375 was had. Defendants
moved for a new trial and, pending determination by the court, entered into a
settlement with the plaintiff without his attorney's knowledge whereby plaintiff
received $200 in cash, was employed by the company and agreed to dismiss
the case. When defendants filed a copy of the settlement and requested the
court to enter a dismissal, Pope objected. Upon the court's overruling defendant's motion for a new trial, Pope filed the present petition for $687.50 or
one-half the amount of the judgment. The trial court entered judgment for
the attorney in the amount claimed. Held, judgment affirmed. While that part
of the attorney's contract requiring consent of all parties to settlement is void,
the provision for the fee stands. Appellants had notice of the lien. The employment of Robinson must be considered to have cash value and the settlement
to have been in full satisfaction of the judgment. Appellant's settlement without knowledge of plaintiff's attorney was at their peril. Jellico Cod Mining
. Co. v. Pope, (Ky. 1942) 166 S. W. (2d) 287.1
BANKRUPTCY - CORPORATE REORGANIZATION - RETENTION OF JURISDICTION BY COURT AFTER APPROVAL OF PLAN OF REORGANIZATION SUBSEQUENT DEBTS As EXPENSES OF ADMINISTRATION -The debtor, Michel,
Makaik & Feldman, Inc., petitioned for reorganization in August, 1935.
A plan of reorganization was submitted providing for thirty per cent shrinkage
2 See generally as to validity of state bar acts and annual license fees, l 14 A.L.R.
161 (1938). See also 66 A.L.R. 1512 (1930); 81 A.L.R. 1064 (1932).
1
See Leish, "Attorney's Charging Lien," 15 IND. L. J. 202 (1940); Sommerich
and Heilpern, "Attorney's Charging Lien in New York," 71 U. S. L. REv. 679
(1937); 26 lowA L. REv. 840 (1941); and generally 29 CAL. L. REv. 628 (1941).
See also 2 A. L. R. 337 (1919) (attorney's lien on proceeds of settlement before
judgment); 67 A. L. R. 442 (1930) (attorney's right to haye case continued to
protect compensation).
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in the claims of existing creditors, the balance to be paid in installments over a
period of four years. In the event of default in any installment a creditors'
committee designated under the plan was authorized to immediately liquidate
the debtor's assets under the supervision of the committee or at the committee's
option under the supervision of the federal district court "in the proceedings now .
pending." In the order of confirmation by the court it was stated that all the
assets of the debtor should be deemed to be the ·property of the debtor free and
clear of all claims of its creditors and that the court should retain jurisdiction
over the debtor and its assets "until full compliance with this decree has been
made." The .first default under the plan occurred in I 938 and thereafter no
payments were made. After granting extensions from time to time, in May
1940 the committee decided that the debtor was hopelessly insolvent and
undertook its liquidation. In August l 940 after most of the assets had been
reduced to cash the committee petitioned the court to "retake jurisdiction" in
order to decide priorities among various classes of creditors. In particular,
creditors whose claims were incurred after the confirmation of the reorganization plan claimed priority as "expenses of administration" over the old debts.
The court "resumed" jurisdiction and referred the matter to a bankruptcy
referee who found in favor of the subsequent creditors. The district court
reversed the referee's findings. On appeal, held, district court sustained. The
subsequent creditors have shown no ground for ,priority of their claims as expenses of administration. While the provisions of section 77B as to reorganizations are not very explicit, the provisions for liquidation only if no plan is agreed
on and for discharge of the trustee upon confirmation of the plan 1 imply that
the court's supervision ends with the confirmation of the plan of reorganization.
Any jurisdiction retained is not for control of the corporation but simply to aid
in the operation of the plan and to protect the old creditors. The reorganization
plan in the present case seems to have proceeded on that assumption. And
while the retaking of jurisdiction by the district court is ambiguous, it may be
assumed that it was in pursuance of the provisions of the creditors' agreement.
Furthermore all creditors have accepted that jurisdiction and cannot now
challenge it. In providing for liquidation of the assets of the debtor, the parties
to the creditors' agreement must have contemplated distribution according to
the law the court would norm~Ily apply, i. e., bankruptcy principles, and there
can consequently be no priority for persons who extended credit after the date
of the reorganization. Clinton Trust Co. v. John H. Elliott Leather Co.,
(C. C. A. 2d, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 299.2
BANKRUPTCY - FACTS JusTIFYING DENIAL OF D1scFIARGE - GAMBLER's FAILURE TO KEEP BooKs -Petitioner brought a voluntary petition
in bankruptcy, stating that he had lost $15,000 in daily gambling in small
transactions and showing liabilities of $8,000 to banks and friends borrowed
48 Stat. L. 917, 921, § 77B, sub. c (8), k (1934), since revised by Chapter X
of the Chandler Act, 52 Stat. L. 883 (1938), I I U.S. C. (1940), § 501 et seq.
2
In general as to what are expenses and services under § 77 B, see cases collected
in 107 A. L. R. 537 (1937).
1
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for the purpose of gambling. In 1933 petitioner had received a discharge in
bankruptcy due to the same cause, and the present petition was begun just beyond
the six-year period necessary under the statute 1 to make him again eligible for a
discharge. One of the creditors objected to petitioner's discharge on the ground
of the section of the Bankruptcy Act which provides that discharge may be
refused if the bankrupt has failed to keep records "from which his financial
condition and business transactions might be ascertained, unless the court deems
such acts or failure to have been justified under all the circumstances of the
case.'' 2 The bankrupt has only a notebook containing entries of the dates
and amounts won or lost and he professed not to remember the names, addresses
or telephone numbers of any of the various bookmakers with whom he had made
bets on horse races, prize fights, etc. Under the New York law, the loser in a
gambling transaction may recover from the winner all payments he has made,
and this right would have passed to petitioner's trustee. The referee and the
district court denied the discharge. Held, affirmed. The fact that most habitual
gamblers do not keep a record of their losses is no excuse for petitioner's failure
to keep books, especially when such memoranda as were preserved tended to
cover up rather than explain the claimed transactions. Klein v. Morris Plan
Industrial Bank of New York, (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 809. 8
BANKRUPTCY-VOIDABLE PREFERENCES UNDER SECTION 60 (a) AssIGNMENT OF AccoUNTS RECEIVABLE WITHOUT NoTICE To DEBTORS-The
Quaker City Sheet Metal Company, being embarrassed for working capital,
obtained the consent of its creditors to subordinate their claims to claims incurred
for new working capital. Thereafter petitioners made loans to the company on
its accounts receivable, no notice of the assignments being given to the debtors.
The company having gone into bankruptcy, the trustee challenged petitioner's
security because of the omission of notice. He was overruled by the referee
and the district court but was sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit 1 in an interpretation of section 60 (a) of the Bankruptcy
Act 2 which conflicted with the interpretation of the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit.8 Held, affirmed. The present assignments are voidable
preferences under the literal application of the act, which tests the effectiveness
of a transfer as against the trustee by the standards which applicable state law
would enforce against a good faith purchaser. There is no public policy in favor
of ~he business of "non-notification financing"; in fact, such financing has many
of the harmful effects of the secret liens which the act was intended to prevent.
1

30 Stat. L. 550, as amended, II U.S. C. (1940), § 32 (c) (5).
2 Id., § 3 2 ( C) ( 2) •
8 See generally, on failure to keep books as ground for refusal of discharge, 73
A. L. R. 1157 (1931); 55 HARV. L. REV. 282 (1941); 48 w. VA. L. Q. 278
(1942).
1

ln re Quaker City Sheet Metal Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 894.
52 Stat. L. 869 (1938), 11 U.S. C. (1940), § 96 (a).
8
Adams v. City Bank & Trust Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) IIS F. (2d) 453.
2
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Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, (U. S. 1943) 63
S. Ct. 679. 4
BILLS AND NoTEs - EFFECT OF INTERMEDIATE TRANSFER FoR GAMBLING DEBT ON RIGHTS OF HoLDER IN DuE COURSE-Defendant bank
issued a negotiable certificate to Norrell, who endorsed it to King in payment
of a gambling debt. Thereafter King negotiated the instrument to plaintiff,
for full value and without notice of the gambling transaction. In the meantime the payee had notified the bank not to make payment. Upon the bank's
refusal to pay, plaintiff sued it. From a decree of dismissal below, he appealed.
11e'ld, that a negotiable instrument founded upon a valid consideration does not
become void in the hands of a holder in due course by reason of the fact that
an intermediate negotiation was based on a gambling consideration. The
statute 1 that all contracts founded on a gambling consideration shall be void
must be limited to its terms. Snoddy v. American Nat. Bank, 2 decided by this
court, holding an instrument void in the hands of a holder in due course under
that statute, was a case of an instrument founded on a gambling consideration.3
Winecoff Operating Co. v. Pioneer Bank, (Tenn. 1942) 165 S. W. (2d)
585.4
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -VALIDITY OF CALIFORNIA MILK CONTROL
AcT AS APPLIED TO SALES TO FEDERAL GovERNMENT-A California statute 1
declares the production and distribution of fluid milk to be a business affected
with a public interest and empowers the Director of Agriculture to license distributors and to establish marketing areas within which uniform prices and
regulations shall prevail. Appellant was a licensed distributor in the Santa Clara
County area and entered into a contract with the United States War Department to sell milk to the Quartermaster's Department at Moffett Field in Santa
Clara County at less than the minimum price fixed for that area. Moffett
Field is owned by the :United States and under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
4
See discussion of the meaning and history of § 60 in 41 MICH. L. REv. 473
(1942), and other law review discussions cited by the Court; also Hanna, "Some Unsolved Problems under Section 6oa of the Bankruptcy Act," 43 CoL. L. REv. 58
(1943).

1

Tenn. Code ( 1938), § 78 l 2.
88 Tenn. 573, 13 S. W. 127 (1889).
8
The court cited a number of cases from other jurisdictions on both sides of the
question, but explained the contrary ones on the ground that the applicable gambling
statutes were much broader. Cf. Clemmer Motor Co. v. Towler, (Tenn. 1942) 165
S. W. (2d) 581.
4
See 56 A. L. R. 1322 (1928). On effect of the Negotiable Instruments Law
on earlier gambling statutes, see 8 A. L. R. 3 14 ( l 920) ; I I A. L. R. 2 I l ( l 921) ;
37 A. L. R. 698 (1925); 46 A. L. R. 959 (1927).
2

1
Cal. Agr. Code (Deering, 1937), §§ 735-738, as amended (Deering, Supp.
1941), pp. 462-467.
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federal government. Complaint was :filed with the Department of Agriculture
charging appellant with violating the criminal provisions 2 for the enforcement
of the Mille Control Act. Appellant soug~t a writ of mandamus from the
Supreme Court of California to restrain the Department of Agriculture from
proceeding to hear and act upon th'.e complaint. Mandamus was denied,8 and on
.. appeal to the United, States Supreme Court, held, that California cannot regulate
the sale of milk on Moffett Field unless Congress so authorizes. The argument
that it is the purchasing, handling and processing of milk on California territory,
not the sale on Moffett Field, which is punished evades the issues. Our present
holding is consistent with the holding this same day in Penn Dairies v. Milk
Control C ommission,4 where state regulations were applied on land merely
leased to the federal government. Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground
that no distinction could be made between land owned by the federal government and land held under lease. Justice Murphy dissented on the ground that
the federal government should not insist on exclusive jurisdiction where there
is no overriding national purpose to be served. Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture of California, (U. S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 628.5

CONTEMPT- FEDERAL COURTS - JURISDICTION - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - In ]t'ebruary 1936, the petitioners, a political boss in Missouri, the
state superintendent of insurance and an insurance agent, fraudently procured
a federal district court's consent to a settlement of an insurance rate case. In
1939 investigations by the Department of Internal Revenue disclosed that huge
amounts of the settlement payments went to petitioners personally. The insurance case was reopened and a correct decree made. May 20, I 940, the court
.requested the district attorney to institute contempt proceedings against the
petitioners and on July 13, 1940, an information was :filed. Motions to abate
and quash were overruled and petitioners were adjudged guilty of contempt.1
The circuit court affirmed.2 On certiorari, held that the petitioners' acts constituted contempt unaer ~ction 268 of the Judicial Code 3 but that a criminal
contempt is an offense within the meaning of the three-year statute of limita2

Cal. Stat. (1941), c. 1214, p. 3008.
19 Cal. (2d) 818, 123 P. (2d) 442 (1942,).
4
(U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 617.
5
See Ball, "State Laws on Federal Lands in Alabama," I ALA. LAWY. 346 (1940);
6 KAN. B. A. J. 322 (1938); annotation on state laws regulating grazing and pasture
of sheep and goats on federal land, 70 A. L. R. 410 (1931); annotations on applicability of state statutes to contracts for performance of work on land owned or leased
by the federal government, 91 A. L. R. 779 (1934), 115 A. L. R. 371 (1938), 127
A. L. R. 827 (1940).
Case noted II GEo. WASH. L. REv. 381 (1943).
8

1
United States v. Pendergast, (D. C. Mo. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 189, noted 29
GEo. L. J. 917 (1941),
2
O'Malley v. United States, (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 676.
8
28 U.S. C. (1940), § 385.
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tions on crimes 4 so that the proceeding is barred. Judgment reversed. Pendergast v. United States, (U. S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 268.11
CONTRACTS - IMPOSSIBILITY - EFFECT ON ARBITRATION CLAUSE Defendant had agreed in writing to purchase from plaintiff at a specified price
20,000 yards of rayon to be delivered "April/May when ready." At the time
for delivery, defendant claimed he could not accept the goods without violating
government priority regulations 1 which forbad any person having on hand
more than a practicable minimum working inventory, and that the contract
had therefore become impossible of performance. The contract contained arbitration provisions which plaintiff is now seeking to enforce. Held, reversing the
trial court,2 whatever impossibility has here arisen is due not to law but to the
action of the buyer in accumulating or retaining an inventory of abnormal size.
Motion to compel defendant to submit differences to arbitration is granted. The
court distinguished Matter of Kramer & U chitelle, 8 wherein arbitration was
denied the purchaser and the seller's performance was held completely excused
under a contract to supply cotton gray goods at a price higher than that permitted by maximum price regulations issued after the execution of the contract.
Federated Textiles v. Glamour Girl, 265 App. Div. 252, 38 N. Y. S. (2d)

493 (1942).4
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE - DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - Defe_ndant was convicted of operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated and brings exceptions. He was sitting in the driver's
seat of an automobile which was being towed by a truck ahead and whose front
wheels were suspended in the air so that turning the steering wheel could not
control the car. However, while going up an icy grade the defendant applied
power to the rear wheels of the towed vehicle to aid progress. There was
no dispute on the question of intoxication. Held, defendant was "operating
a motor vehicle" within the language of the statute. Full control of the direction and speed is not necessary as long as there is some manipulation of the
machinery of the car. While as a general rule penal statutes should be strictly
construed, gasoline and alcohol are such a dangerous mixture that the hazard
Rev. Stat. (1878), § 1044, 18 U.S. C. (1940), § 582.
Cf. 3 UNiv. NEWARK L. REv. 102 (1938), criticizing a New Jersey case
which took a contrary view. Case noted II GEo. WASH. L. REv. 383 (1943).
4

5

1
Priority Regulation No. 1, § 944.14, as amended December 23, 1941, C.C.H.
WAR LAW SERVICE, Priorities, 1f 30,901.23.
2
(S. Ct. 1942) 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 466.
8
288 N. Y. 467, 43 N. E. (2d) 493 (1942).
4
See Pedrick and Springfield, "War Measures and Contract Liability," 20 TEX.
L. REV. 710 (1942); 28 VA. L. REV. 72 (1941), 655 (1942); and generally 18
Cm-KENT L. REV. 164 (1940); Colson, "The Excuse of Impossibility in West Virginia Contract Law," 48 W. Va. L. Q. 189 (1942); annotations 137 A. L. R. 1199
at 1210 ( 1942) (performance of contract excused because illegal due to war conditions), 141 A. L. R. 1502 (1942) (price ceilings adopted as war measures as affecting
pre-existing contracts).
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should be reduced to the minimum. State v. Roberts, (Me. 1942) 29 A. (2d)
1
457·
EQUITY - REMEDY FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT TO DEVISE - Plaintiff
sued to rescind a contract with defendants ~hereby she had leased a house and
lot to defendants and agreed to devise the premises to the lessees or the survivors
of them. Plaintiff claimed that defendants had not complied with the conditions
of the agreement and had conveyed the land to N subject to the rights of
defendants. Defendants counterclaimed, requesting specific performance and
· a declaratory judgment that their contract is in full effect and the deed to N is
void. Held, after finding that defendants had complied with the conditions of
the contract, while a decree for specific performance cannot now be made, a
decree may issue that the contract is valid and complete, that the conveyance to
N is a fraud as against defendants, that N holds title in trust for defendants
and shall convey to them or the survivor of them upon the death of plaintiff if
one or both of them survive and the conditions of the contract have been fully
complied with, and restraining plaintiff and N from conveying or encumbering
the premises. Hill v. Ribble, (N. J. Ch. 1942) 28 A. (2d) 780.1
EVIDENCE - BusINEss ENTRIES - APPLICATION OF . MonEL AcT TO
EMPLOYEE's REPORT OF AccIDENT - In a suit arising from a grade crossing
accident defendants, representatives of the· railroad, offered in evidence as a
statement "in the regular course of business" the engineer's statements in an
interview by an assistant superintendent of the railroad and a member of the
Public Utilities Commission. The statement was excluded by the district court
and judgment thereafter rendered for plaintiff was affirmed by the circuit court
of appeals.1 Defendants brought certiorari. Held, affirmed. The statement
was properly excluded. The federal statute 2 embodying the model business
entries act was meant to apply only to records made for thf: systematic conduct
of a business. A report of an accident is not a typical business entry, but is made
primarily for use in litigation rather than in conducting the business. To allow
1
On construction of criminal statutes generally, see Hall, "Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes," 48 HARV. L. REv. 748 (1935); 32 M1cH. L. REv. 976
(1934).
1

See 66 A. L. R. 1439 (1930) on remedies during promisor's lifetime for breach
of agreement to give property at death. Cf. 69 A. L. R. 14 (1930) and 106 A. L, R.
742 (1<>37) as to remedies for breach of decedent's agreement to devise, bequeath or
leave property as compensation for services.
1

Hoffman v. Palmer, (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 976, noted 56 HARV.
L. REV. 458 (1942).
2
49 Stat. L. 1561 (1936), 28 U.S. C. (1940), § 695. The federal act adopted
the Model Act proposed by a committee of the Commonwealth Fund, whose conclusions were published in MoRGAN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: So:1.rn PROPOSALS FOR ITS
REFORM (1927). The Model Act has been adopted in New York and at least two
other states. See discussion in I I BROOKLYN L. REv. 78 (1941). The Uniform
Business Records"as Evidence Act, approved by the commissioners in 1936, is substantially similar and has been adopted in eleven states and Hawaii. See discussion in 24
MINN. L. REV. 958 (1940).
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statements of interested parties to be admitted merely because they are habitually
taken by the business firm would pervert the purpose of the statute, which was
to facilitate admission of records shown by experience to be trustworthy. There
is nothing in the act to indicate that Congress meant to extend its effect beyond
the historical meaning of entries in the "regular course of business." Palmer v.
Hoffman, (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 477.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS - QUALIFICATIONS OF EXECUTORS WHETHER STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION ExcLusrvE-DisTINCTION AS TO ADMINISTRATORS - Testatrix' will appointed her oldest son,
Rudolph, executor. The other children objected because of ill-will existing
between themselves and the nominee, and petitioned the court to appoint a
disinterested person as administrator with the will annexed. The nominee filed
a cross-petition for the probate of the will and issuance of letters testamentary
to him. The nominee was not incompetent under any of the statutory grounds,1
but the lower court appointed a bank as administrator with the will annexed.
On appeal, held, reversed and remanded. The statutory grounds for disqualification of an executor are exclusive by the majority of decided cases and in
California, from which the Utah statute was copied. A different rule applies
in the case of administrators, where the statutory grounds for disqualification
are not exclusive.ii In re Raat's Estate, (Utah, 1942) 132 P. (2d) 136.
FEDERAL COURTS -APPEAL AND ERROR - EFFECT OF RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE ON APPEALABILITY OF ORDER TAKING PLACE OF INJUNCTION
- Plaintiffs brought suit in a New Jersey state court to recover on an insurance
policy. The cause was removed to the federal district court. Plaintiffs demanded a jury. Defendants answered that the policies had been obtained by
fraud of the insured and were void because of material false statements in the
application. Defendants also filed a counterclaim of an equitable nature praying
that the policies be decreed void upon return of the premiums paid thereon and
that plaintiffs be enjoined from prosecuting the action at law. The district
court denied plaintiffs' motion for dismissal of the counterclaim and ordered
that the equity issue should be disposed of prior to the jury trial. Plaintiffs
appealed. The circuit court certified the question whether the order that the
equitable issue should be tried first was appealable. Held, yes. Although the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have abolished the distinction between law and
equity, the separation of issues to be tried by court and jury necessitates the same
result as under the old rules. If the district court finds for the defendant on the
counterclaim, it will terminate the jury action. The order therefore has the
effect of an injunction and is appealable under section 129 of the Judicial Code.1
Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., (U. S. 1942) 63 S. Ct. 163.2
1

Utah Code (1943), § 102-3-15.
136 A. L. R. 604 at 606 ( l 942) collects cases on personal interest, conduct or
attitude as affecting appointment of a special or temporary administrator pending will
contest. Exclusiveness of statutory disqualifications of administrators is discussed 26
WAsH. UNIV L. Q. 106 at 118 (1940), 257 (1941).
2

1

28 U.S. C. (1940), § 227.
Cf. discussion of appeals from separable legal issues under federal rules of civil
procedure, 26 CoRN. L. Q. 485 (1941).
2
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FEDERAL CouR:rs - INJUNCTION AGAINST SuIT IN STATE CouRT RENT PROVISIONS OF EMERGENCY PRICE CONTROL ACT - The Price Administrator sued in a federal district court to enjoin execution by defendant
property owner of a judgment for eviction of her tenant allegedly in violation
of regulations issued under the Emergency Price Control Act.1 Defendant
contended that the court was prohibited from granting relief under section 26 5
of the Judicial Code 2 providing that "The writ of injunction shall not be
granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a
State. . . ." Held, the court has no power to grant relief. The section of the
EPCA vesting federal district courts with jurisdiction of criminal proceedings
for violations of the act does not alter the express provision of section 265. Even
though the acts sought to be prevented are violations of the EPCA, the remedy
requested by plaintiff is prohibited. Henderson v. Fleckinger, (D. C. La. 1943)
48 F. Supp. 236.3
FEDERAL COURTS INJUNCTION AGAINST SUIT IN STATE COURT SuIT TO CONSTRUE WILL - Respondent, a citizen of California, brought a
suit in federal district court in Illinois, aga.inst citizens of Illinois, for construction of a will probated in Illinois. Land located irt Minnesota, Wisconsin and
Illinois was involved. Thereafter defendants in this suit began a suit ·in a
Minnesota state court against respondent for a construction of so much of the
will as related to Minnesota land and a similar suit in a Wisconsin court. On
motion of respondents, the federal district judge granted an injunction against
the prosecution of the pending suits in Minnesota and Wisconsin. The circuit
court of appeals a:ffirmed.1 On certiorari to the Supreme Court, held that under
the federal statute,2 except as authori~ed in bankruptcy proceedings "the writ
of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay
proceedings in any court of a state." There is a long-recognized exception that
as between two suits pending before a state and a federal court, both of which
are in rem or quasi in rem, the court first acquiring jurisdiction or assuming
control of the property is entitled to maintain and exercise its jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the other. However, in the present suit the federal district court of
Illinois could render only a personal judgment as to the Minnesota or Wisconsin
land, so it does not have exclusive jurisdiction. Judgment reversed with directions to vacate the injunction. Mandeville v. Canterbury, (U. S. 1943) 63

S. Ct. 472.3
1

56 Stat. L. 23 (1942), 50 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1943), Appendix, §§ 901-946.
28 U.S. C. ·(1940), § 379.
3
On exception' to § 26 5 where state suit is in aid of violation of federal statute,
see 13 So. CAL. L. REv. 331 at 338 (1940), where suit is by federal government, see
Taylor and Wills, "Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts,"
42 YALE L. J. II69 at u92 (1933).
2

1

Canterbury v. Mandeville, (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 130 F. (2d) 208 ..
Judicial Code,§ 265, 28 U.S. C. (1940), § 379·
8 See generally on pendency of action in federal court as ground of enjoining
action in state court, 24 A. L. R. 1084 .(1923); 122 A. L. R. 1425 (1939); 137
A. L. R. 983 (1942); 13 So. CAL. L. REv. 331 (1940).
2
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INSURANCE - NECESSITY OF CONTINUANCE OF INSURABLE INTEREST OF
CORPORATION INSURING LIFE OF OFFICER - The Weyman Mortgage Company took out a policy of insurance, payable to itself as beneficiary, on the life
of Chapman, an officer and stockholder. Later the company was reorganized
as Lipscomb-Ellis Company and Chapman completely severed his connections
with it. However, the policy was assigned to the new company and that company paid the premiums until Chapman's death. Chapman's executor sought to
restrain payment of the proceeds of the policy to the company, and the insurer
paid the fund to a custodian. The lower court held for the company and the
executor brought error. Held, the proceeds of the policy should be paid to the
assignee rather than to the insured's executor. A policy of insurance which was
valid when issued does not become void by the termination of the beneficiary's
insurable interest unless so provided in the policy itself. Chapman v. LipscomhEllis Co., (Ga. 1942) 22 S. E. (2d) 393.1
LABOR LAW - INTERSTATE COMMERCE - INJUNCTION AGAINST RAILROAD. STRIKE - EXTENSION OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER - JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURT - ARBITRATION AS PREREQUISITE - Plaintiff
is an interstate carrier operating between Effner, Indiana and Keokuk, Iowa,
through Illinois. In October I 940 employees of plaintiff selected defendant
unions to represent them under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act. 1 Following this, plaintiff and the labor unions submitted counterproposals for
settlement of working conditions and rates of pay. Negotiations were carried on
for a considerable period of time with the aid of the National Mediation Board,
but finally after plaintiff declined a proposal to arbitrate they were terminated by
the board. A strike called for December 9, I 94 I, was postponed at the request
of the Mediation Board, but upon plaintiff's insistence that its proposed rates of
pay, rules and working conditions should become effective at midnight December 29, a strike was called for that date. There was considerable violence on
the part of the strikers and on January 3, 1943, plaintiff filed complaint in the
federal district court seeking an injunction against defendants. The court issued
a temporary restraining order and within five days plaintiff began to present its
evidence in support of the application for temporary injunction. Due to the
number of witnesses and voluminous testimony the court extended the temporary
restraining order on January 8 and again on January 16. After the evidence
was concluded on January 19, the court issued a temporary injunction. Defendants seek reversal. Three important issues were decided by the circuit court,
which held: (I) The trial court had authority to extend the five-day limit of the
1

On termination of insurable interest and necessity of insurable interest in an
assignee, see Patterson, "Insurable Interest in Life," 18 CoL. L. REv. 381 at 414
(1918); 26 CoRN. L. Q. 497 (1941); 29 ILL. B. J. 482 (1941); 4 JoHN MARSHALL L. Q. 40 5 ( 193 9) ; Collins, "The Doctrine of Insurable Interest in Illinois
as Applied to Life Insurance," 9 CHr-KENT L. REv. 160 at 188 (1931); 12 LoYOLA
L. ]. 73 (1931); 6 Mo. L. REv. 221 (1941); 15 TEMP. L. Q. 175 (1940.); 26
WASH. UNiv. L. Q. 277 (1941). See generally, Cain, "Insurable Interest in Life,"
6 BosT. UNiv. L. REv. l 1 l (1926).
1

48 Stat. L. 1186 (1934), 45 U.S. C. (1940), § 152 (4).
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restraining order. The purpose of the five-day limit in the Norris-LaGuardia
Act 2 was to prevent restraint without a hearing on the question of substantial
and irreparable injury for so long a time as to affect materially the effort of the
striking employees. It was not to prevent hearings lasting longer than five days.
But in any event the restraining order merged in the temporary injunction. (2)
The federal court had jurisdiction of the action as arising under a law of the
United States, not simply because interstate commerce was involved but because
defendants' acts prevented plaintiff's carrying out the duty imposed on it by the
Interstate Commerce Act 8 to provide reasonable facilities for the interchange
of interstate traffic. (3) The plaintiff was not barred from relief by its refusal
to arbitrate. Section 108 of the Norris LaGuardia Act provides: "No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant who has
failed ... to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or
voluntary arbitration." 4 Arbitration is expressly stated to be voluntary not mandatory, and negotiation, mediation and arbitration are alternatives, any one of
which fills the requirements where the employer acts in good faith. Furthermore, section 108 does not apply where there is violence or threatened violence.
Toledo, P. & W.R. R. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, (C. C. A. 7th,

1942) 132 F. (2d) 265.6
PROCESS - SERVICE ON AGENT WHERE INTEREST ANTAGONISTIC TO
PRINCIPAL -Appellee recovered judgment against one Marion Dusheck and
caused a writ of garnishment-to issue against appellant employer. The writ was
sei:ved on "M. Dusheck" as agent of appellant. M. Dusheck and Marion Dusheck are the same person. Answers to the interrogatories were executed and
sworn to in the name of Marion Dusheck and judgment of condemnation was
entered against appellant. Appellant's motion to quash the service of the writ of
garnishment and to vacate the judgment were denied by the trial court and this
appeal was taken. U ncontradicted affidavits of appellant in suport of its motions
stated that on the day of service of the writ the local sales manager and assistant
sales manager were out and that Marion Dusheck, appellant's secretary, was the
only person in appellant's office; and that prior to receipt by appellant of actual
notice of the writ or judgment "Marion Dusheck's services had been terminated
and full payment made to her. Held, that assuming that Marion Dusheck was
an agent of the appellant within the statute permitting service of process against
a foreign corporation by service upon an agent of the corporation, mere C?mpliance with the formalities of th-: statute is not enough where the circumstances
are such that notice will not be likely to com";: to the attention of the defendant.
2

47 Stat. L. 71, § 7 (1932), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 107.
24 Stat. L. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S. C. (1940), § I (4), (6), (n),
(18), and (20).
4
47 Stat. L. 72, § 8 (1932), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 108.
5
See 21 MICH. L. REv. 90 (1922) (railway strike injunction); 32 MICH.
L. REv. 240 (1934) (strike as interference with interstate commerce). See also annotations on validity and effect of statutes restricting remedy by injunction in industrial
disputes: 27 A. L. R. 411 (1923); 35 A. L. R. 460 (1925); 97 A. L. R. 1333
(1935); 106 A.- L. R. 361 (1937); 120 A. L. R. 316 (1939); 124 A. L. R. 751
(1940); 127 A. L. R. 868 (1940).
8
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It should have been obvious to the officer making service and certainly to appellee that the person accepting service was the judgment debtor. Encyclopaedia
Brittannica, Inc. v. Shannon, U.S. Ct. App. D. C., decided Jan. 25, 1943.1
STATUTES - CONSTRUCTION OF AcT PERMITTING INFORMER's AcTION
FOR DAMAGES FOR FRAUDULENT CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATESOn November 3, 1939, the government indicted Hess and others for conspiracy
to defraud. The defendants entered a plea of nolo contendere and on February
6, 1940, fines were imposed. On January 25, 1940, Marcus brought the present
action in the name of the United States, based on the statute 1 allowing "any"
person in behalf of the government to bring an action for damages for fraud on
the United States and retain half the amount recovered. Marcus' complaint
was substantially a copy of the indictment, although he asserts that he made an
independent investigation and presented more evidence than the government
discovered. Marcus was successful in the district court, but that judgment was
reversed in the circuit court of appeals. 2 In the proceeding on writ of certiorari,
the Supreme Court requested the government to file a brief amicus curiae. This
brief argued that effective law enforcement requires that control of litigation be
left to the attorney general; that divided control is against the public interest;
that the attorney general might believe that war interests would be injured by
filing suits such as this; that permission to outsiders to sue might bring unseemly races for the opportunity of profiting from the government's investigations; and finally that conditions have changed since the act was passed in 1863.
Held, judgment for petitioner reinstated. The terms of the statute allow no
room for construction and the arguments of the government should be directed
to Congress, not to the court. Justice Jackson, dissenting, argued that the fact
that the statute had never before been applied in this manner should establish
a practical construction; also that the decision in Francis v. United States 8 that
a civil action by the government would preclude an informer's action might very
well have been extended to the institution by the government of criminal proceedings. United States ex. rel. Marcus v. Hess, (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 379.
TAXATION - EsTATE TAX - CHARITABLE DEDUCTIONS - DETERMINATION OF AMOUNT - Testator bequeathed the residue of his estate to four
named charitable organizations. After deducting funeral and administration
expenses and specific "bequests, but not the federal estate tax, the residuary estate
amounted to $463,103.08. Respondents claimed they were entitled to deduct
this amount as a charitable gift from the gross estate in computing the estate
tax. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that only that portion of
the estate actually distributed to charitable donees after paying the estate tax
1

The same result was reached by the Michigan court under almost identical circumstances. John W. Masury & Son v. Lowther, 299 Mich. 516, 300 N. W. 866
(1941), noted 5 UNIV. DETROIT L. J. 128 (1942).
1
Rev. Stat. (1878), §§ 5438, 3490-3493, 18 U. S. C. (1940), § 80, 82-86,
31 U.S. C. (1940), §§ 231-234.
2
(C. C. A. 3d, 1942) 127 F. (2d) 233, reversing (D. C. Pa. 1941) 41 F. Supp.
1 97·
3
5 Wall. (72 U.S.) 338 (1866).
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could be deducted. He fixed the tax at $459,879.s7, leaving $3,223.51 actually
passing under the residuary bequest. In a suit for refund after payment under
protests, the district and circuit courts 1 held for respondents on the ground that
under Illinois law the federal estate tax was a charge against the entire estate and
was not "payable out of" the charitable bequests within the meaning of the
section 807. 2 On certiorari, held, reversed and the commisioner's interpretation
adopted. The legislative history of section 807 shows that it was intende\i to
overrule Edwards v. Slocum, 8 which had held against the government on facts
substantially identical with the present case. The mathematical difficulties of
determining two mutually dependent variables is without significance. Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., (U. S. 1942) 63 S. Ct. 361.4
I

TAXATION - INCOME TAX - INTEREST ON COMPENSATION FOR PROP' ERTY CONDEMNED AS CAPITAL GAIN OR ORDINARY INCOME -Taxpayers
owned a piece of real estate in New York City. In December 1932 that city's
board of estimate passed a resolution as part of eminent domain proceedings
directing that on January 3, 1933, title to that property should vest in the city.
The eminent domain law provided that, in addition to the value of-the property
at the time of taking, interest from the date of vesting of title in the city to the
date of -the final decree should be awarded as part of the compensation to the
owner. Taxpayers were awarded $73,246.57 of which $58,000 was treated
as the value of the property on January 3, 1933 and the balance as interest to
May 12, 1937, the date of the final decree. Taxpayers reported the difference
between the total sum received and their tax basis as a capital gain, retµrning
only part as income. 1 The commissioner assessed a deficiency on the portion
of the award computed as interest on the ground that that portion was ordinary
income. The Board of Tax Appeals reversed 2 but the circuit court of appeals
held with the commissioner.3 This conflicted with an earlier holding of the
second circuit that the entire payments were to be considered as compensation
for the land. 4 Held, on certiorari, whether the additional payments were ·con-·
1

Northern Trust Co. v. Harrison, (C.C.A. 7th, 1942) 125 F. (2d) 893.
47 Stat. L. 282, § 807 (1932), 26 U. S. C. (1940), § 812 (d): "If the [federal estate] tax ... [is] either by the terms of the will, [or] by the law of the jurisdiction under which the estate is administered ... payable in whole or in part out of
the bequests, legacies, or devises otherwise deductible under this paragraph [ charitable
gifts], then the amount deductible under this paragraph shall be the amount of such
bequests, legacies, or devises reduced by the amount of such taxes."
3
. 264 U. S. 61, 44 S. Ct. 293 (1924).
4
Cf. Commissioner v. Merchants Nat. Bank of Boston, (C. C. A. 1st, 1942) 132
F. (2d) 483, where it was held that no deduction for estate tax purposes could be made
when the amount of the charitable gift was highly uncertain. The testator had bequeathed to charity the residue of a trust after the death of the income life tenant, for
whose comfort, support, maintenance, and/or happiness the trustee in his discretion
could invade the corpus.
See also, on conditional nature of gift or bequest for public, charitable or religious
uses as preventing deduction in computing estate tax, 107 A. L. R. 801 ( l 93 7).
2

1
2
8

4

49 Stat. L. 1691, § II7 (1936), now 26 U.S. C. (1940), § u7.
Henry A. Kieselbach, 44 B. T. A. 279 (1941)..
Commissioner v. Kieselbach, (C. C. A. 3d, 1942) 127 F. (2d) 359.
Seaside Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) 105 F. (2d)

I

RECENT DECISIONS

1003

sidered as interest or as compensation for delayed payment, they are ordinary
income and not part of the sale price. Kieselbach v. Commissioner, (U. S.
1 943) 63 S. Ct. 303. 5
.
TAXATION - LIEN FOR EsTATE TAX ON LAND OwNED BY ENTIRETIES
- RIGHTS OF MORTGAGOR - CONSTITUTIONALITY - Property held by a
decedent as tenant by the entireties was not included in his gross estate in computing the federal estate tax and, prior to assessment and payment of the tax,
was mortgaged by the widow to petitioner in good faith and for value. After
default, the petitioner bought in the mortgaged property on foreclosure sale.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed an estate tax deficiency against
the decedent's estate by reason of the failure to include the value of the land
held by entireties in the computation of the tax. The Board of Tax Appeals
affirmed, and in the present proceeding to enforce the lien the district court
found in favor of the government 1 and the circuit court affirmed. 2 On certiorari, held, affirmed. The estate tax lien, although unrecorded, was superior to
the mortgage lien as well as to local, state and county liens for taxes which
had accrued after death of the decedent. Section 315 (a) 8 of the Revenue Act
of 1926 provides a special lien for the estate tax which is independent of the
general tax lien provided in section 3186 of the Revised Statutes.4 This is
shown by the history of the statutes, both of which have been re-enacted on
numerous occasions, and by the corollary sections to 315 (a), such as that providing for release to bona fide purchasers before assessment, 5 which would not
be necessary if recording of the tax lien were required under section 3 I 86. As
so construed, section 3 I 5 (a) does not violate the Fifth Amendment. Detroit
Bank v. United States, (U. S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 297.
TRADE RESTRAINTS - MEDICAL ASSOCIATION OBSTRUCTING GROUP
HEALTH AssocIATION As VIOLATING SHERMAN AcT1-The American Medical Association, a corporation, the Medical Society of the District of Columbia, a corporation, two unincorporated associations, and twenty-one individuals who were officers, employees or committee members of the corporations,
were indicted for conspiracy to obstruct the operations of the Group Health
Association, a nonprofit corporation, organized by government employees
to provide medical care and hospitalization to members and their families
on a risk-sharing prepayment basis. The two corporations were found guilty
in the district court on a general verdict and appealed, the other defendants having been found not guilty. From a decision of the circuit court of
990, noted 39 MICH. L. REv. 169'(1940).
5
Case noted I I GEo. WASH. L. REv. 396 (1943).
1

United States v. Paul, (D. C. Mich. 1940) 41 F. Supp. 41.
Paul v. United States, (C. C. A. 6th, 1942) 127 F. (2d) 64.
8
44 Stat. L. 80, § 315 (a) (1926), now 26 U.S. C. (1940), § 827.
4
Rev. Stat. (1878), § 3186, 26 U.' S. C. (1940), §§ 3670-3677.
5
44 Stat. L. 79, § 313 (c) (1926), now 26 U.S. C. (1940), § 827 (c).
2

1

26 Stat. L. 209, § 3 (1890), 15 U.S. C. (1940), § 3.
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appeals affirming the conviction,2 the Supreme Court granted certiorari on three
questions, on which it held as follows: (I) The Group Health Association is in
the business or trade of supplying medical service and hospitalization facilities to
its members, so that it is not necessary to decide whether .the practice of medicine
or the rendering of medical services in themselves are trade. ( 2) The indictment charges a single conspiracy to restrain or obstruct the business of Group
Health so that separate rulings on the sufficiency of each paragraph were not
necessary and the general verdict may stand. The .five paragraphs of the
indictment did not state sep~rate conspiracies but simply-the various purposes
of a single conspiracy: to restrain Group Health from doing business, to restrain
members of Group Health from obtaining adequate medical care according to
Group Health's plan, to restrain doctors serving Group Health in the pursuit
of their calling, to restrain doctors not on Group Health's staff from practicing
in the . District of Columbia in pursuance of their calling, and to restrain
Washington hospitals in the business of operating their hospitals. (3) The
dispute was not one concerning terms and conditions of employment within
the Clayton 3 and Norris-La Guardia 4 acts. Assuming that the, doctors contracting with Group Health were employees of that corporation, petitioners did
not represent present or prospective employees. They were not an association
of employees, but an association of independent practitioners and were interested in "terms and conditions of employment" only in the sense of preventing
employment altogether. American Medical Association v. United States., (U.S.
1943) 63 S. Ct. 326.
WILLS-WHETHER AGREEMENT A CONTRACT OR TESTAMENTARY
GIFT - Appellee's decedent, M, paid $2,000 and $500 to appellant charitable society at different times under identical contracts. In each the society
promised to pay M six per cent interest during her life and also upon sixty
days notice to return all or any part of the principal sum. It was provided
that on M's death the money should become the absolute property of the
society. During M's life interest was paid as promised and $600 was refunded to M at her request. At M's death her administr;,ttrix sued the society
for the return of the balance on the ground that the contracts were testamentary
in character and without consideration. From a judgment for the administratrix, the society appealed. Held, that the contracts were not testamentary, hav- ,
ing become effective immediately. Title to the money passed to the society
at once. The contract was fully executed on the part of the decedent and
appellant furnished consideration by ii:s promise to pay interest and to return
part or all of the money on request. Judgment reversed with instructions to
enter judgment for plaintiff for accrued interest only. Society of Missionary
Catechists of our Blessed Lady of Victory v. Bradley, (Ind. App. 1942) 44
N. E. (2d) 209.1
2

(App. D. C. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 233, noted 29 VA. L. REv. 227 (1942).
38 Stat. L. 730, §§ 6, 20 (1914), 15 U. S. C. (1940), § 17, 29 U. S. C.
(1940), § 52.
4
47 Stat. L. 70, §§ 4, 5, 6, 8, 13, 29 U.S. C. (1940), §§ 104, 105, 106, 108,
II3.
1
See 127 A.L.R. 634 (1940). Cf. 27 YALE L. J. 542 (1918).
3

